DePaul Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 4 Summer 1987

Article 4

Limiting Off-Bench Expressions: Striking a Balance between
Accountability and Independence
James D. Noseda

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
James D. Noseda, Limiting Off-Bench Expressions: Striking a Balance between Accountability and
Independence, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 519 (1987)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol36/iss4/4

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

COMMENT
LIMITING OFF-BENCH EXPRESSION: STRIKING A
BALANCE BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INDEPENDENCE
What may now be seen as a past public faith in American judges may
have been something quite different. It may have been mere apathy, aided
by lack of communications and minimal contact with the courts as compared with today's litigious society. In any event, if it did previously exist
here, a public presumption of impartiality cannot be expected to return as
part of America's view of its judges. The problem now is to consider
whether we are in danger of going, or may have gone, too far in the
direction of a public presumption of partiality.'

The American Bar Association Special Committee on Standards of Judicial
Conduct drafted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2 in response to a
perceived loss of public faith in the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary. 3 Canon 1 of the Code states, "A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity
1. Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, The Delicate Dichotomies of Judicial Ethics, 101
F.R.D. 373, 381. Judge Markey examines in counterpoint the competing interests underlying
the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges. (The Judicial Conference of the United
States adopted the Code in 1973; it is set out in appendix A of the article). Judge Markey
explores the dichotomies of independence versus accountability, isolation versus involvement,
presumption of impartiality versus presumption of partiality, and appearance versus reality.
2. MODEL CODE OF JUDICL CONDUCT (1972) [hereinafter CODE]. Before the 1972 Code,
judges were guided by the American Bar Association CANONS OF JUDICL . ETHICS of 1924. The

Canons of 1924 did not provide the necessary guidance for judges when faced with difficult
questions. This led to the development of the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. See Weistart, Symposium on Judicial Ethics, Foreword, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

1 (1970). Weistart notes that the "recent revival" of public interest in unofficial activities, and
the changes in public sentiment have rendered unacceptable behavior which previously went
unscrutinized. He cautions that. a revision of the ethical codes may only be a temporary stopgap,
and may prove to be ineffective without a concomitant restoration of public confidence in
judicial decisions themselves. Id. at 2. See also Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 9 SAN Doo L. Rav. 793, 795-96 (1972) (purpose of Code is to aid judiciary in
establishing standards of conduct for judges). In In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411, 280 A.2d 370
(1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summed up its sentiment with regard to charges of

judicial misconduct:
The place of justice is a hallowed place .. . and ought to be preserved without

scandal and corruption. So spoke Sir Francis Bacon in the 16th Century. For
generations before and since it has been taught that a judge must possess the
confidence of the community; that he must not only be independent and honest,
but, equally important, believed by all men to be independent and honest. [Jiustice

must not only be done, it must appear to be done. Without the appearance as well
as the fact of justice, respect for the law vanishes in a democracy ....

[T]he

nation is experiencing a deep crisis of confidence in its judiciary. [There is a] widespread impression that the courts are falling far short of discharging their duty to
provide both justice and the appearance of justice.
Id. at 415-16, 280 A.2d at 372 (footnotes omitted).
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and Independence of the Judiciary ' 4 and Canon 2 admonishes, "A Judge
Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His
Activities." ' The principles embodied in Canons I and 2 are intended to
provide the judiciary with basic, fundamental ideals from which judges may
pattern their behavior. 6 But as Judge Markey noted, "Ethical principles...
may themselves be unchallengeable. It is in their application to specific
conduct that discomforting issues are present." 7 Conflicts and a degree of
inconsistency are inevitable whenever an ethical code is interpreted and
applied to specific instances of conduct. Yet, some continuity in standards
is needed if the Code is to function as a practical guide for judicial behavior.8

4. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 1. The text of Canon I reads as follows:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.
A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should
himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence
of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed
and applied to further that objective.
The Code is comprised of nine Canons which describe general standards of conduct. Each
Canon is followed by text, which sets out more specific rules, and commentary where necessary,
to aid in applying the Canons and text. See E.W. THODE, REPORTER's NOTEs To THE CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1, 43 (1972). Thode sets out the Code, recounts the process through
which it developed, and provides additional background, commentary, and analysis for each
Code provision.
5. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 2. The text and commentary of Canon 2 provide in
pertinent part:
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence
his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to
advance the private interests of others ....
Commentary: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance
of impropriety. He must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He
must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
6. See Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROaS. 3 (1970). Judge Kaufman notes that an independent judiciary is part of
our historical ideal, and impartiality is but another facet of judicial independence. Judge
Kaufman trusts judges to act ethically and perceives mandatory ethical codes as a threat to
independence. Id. at 4-5. See, e.g., Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J.
681 (1979) (even limited accountability to peers threatens independence). But cf. Kaufman, The
Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980) (refuting Judge Kaufman's
views; independence and accountability are compatible).
7. Markey, supra note 1, at 374.
8. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hollister, 746
F.2d 420, 425-26 (8th Cir. 1984), resolved ambiguities as to the required time that must pass
before a judge's former law clerk could appear before that judge. The court adopted a circuitwide rule that a minimum of six months must have elapsed since the clerk left the judge's
employ. The court held that the judge should have disqualified himself because only three
months had passed since the prosecutor in the case in question had been the judge's law clerk.
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This Comment will examine the Code's application to situations in which
a judge's impartiality has been questioned because of off-bench involvement
with political or controversial issues. 9 An explanation of the scope of the
Code's provisions will be followed by a discussion of the need for enforceable
standards that can be applied to specific instances of conduct. Inherent in
any discussion of regulating judicial behavior is the effect such regulation
has upon judicial independence. Indeed, the judge's role in society and as
an integral element in our system of government is shaped by the latitude
of activities that are sanctioned by the Code. This Comment proposes that
the delicate balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability
may be refined by combined amendments to the Code, as well as judicial
promulgation of tangible definitions of permissible off-bench judicial activity.
I.

IMPETUS FOR

THE REVISION OF JuDiCiAL ETHICS

The perceived lack of enforceable standards of conduct under the Code's
predecessor, the Canons of Judicial Ethics,10 prompted the drafters to set
enforceable "mandatory standards."" The Canons of Judicial Ethics, although adopted by a majority of jurisdictions,12 were rendered largely ineffective as a limit on judicial conduct by courts that refused to sanction

Id. at 426.
The defendant's motion to disqualify the judge was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455
(1982), which "effectively enacted Canon 3(C) of the . t. Code . . . into law." United States

v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 1978). Canon 3(C) provides: "A judge ... should
disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned

.. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 3(C).
The Hollister decision is an uncommon instance where a rule was adopted pursuant to a
Code provision in lieu of a case specific ruling. The Eighth Circuit's rule assists judges in
applying the Code to a recurring situation.
9. A judge's off-bench speech and associational activities may align a judge with
controversial issues. Partisan political activities, such as campaign conduct and activities on
behalf of elected officials, are beyond the scope of this Comment. Canon 7 addresses both
partisan and nonpartisan political activities. The limitations on campaign conduct in judicial
elections and the required resignation of judges before running for other elective office have
been the focus of most of the commentary on Canon 7. See, e.g., Ashman, Lee & Rosenbaum,
Judges In An Age of Mistrust: Morial And The Policy of Required Resignation, 54 Tan.. L.
REV. 382 (1980) [hereinafter Ashman] (Fifth Circuit upheld Canon 7(A)(3) and denied judge's
request for leave of absence during his campaign for public office); Comment, FirstAmendment
Rights of Attorneys and Judges in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 201 (1986)
(discussing effect of judicial conduct decisions on attorneys' comments concerning judicial
performance).
10. The Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted by the American Bar Association in
1924. See McKay, Judges, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 UTAH
L. REV. 391.
11. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 43. See also Thode, supra note 3, at 793 (discussing
development of the Code and the relationship between its provisions and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics).
12. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 5.
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For example, in Nix v. Standing

Committee, 14 the

Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Canons of Judicial
Ethics were merely advisory and not a binding restriction on judicial conduct. 15 Accordingly, the Oklahoma court granted the writ of prohibition that
a judge sought to prevent the Oklahoma bar from investigating or disciplining
him for political activities which likely were a violation of Canon 30.16 Chief
Justice Halley, in a dissenting opinion, argued that if the Canons were merely
"hortatory" there would have been no point in adopting them. 7
The "moral posturing"'" and generalized exhortations which beset the
Canons of Judicial Ethics were rejected for "enforceable mandatory
standards"' 9 which would provide tangible guidance to proper judicial behavior, and protect and preserve the public trust accorded to judicial officers. 20 In order to implement these new standards, state and federal judicial

conduct organizations were established to investigate and discipline judicial
misconduct. 2' These judicial disciplinary commissions responded to complaints that a judge violated the Code, statutes, constitutional provisions, or
22
any other applicable restrictions on judicial conduct.
As the drafters realized, the full potential of the Code's standards of
conduct could only be achieved through an effective system of procedures
and penalties in each jurisdiction that adopted the Code. 23 However, many

of the Code's mandatory standards are qualified by general admonitions
that a judge "may" and "should" rather than "must" refrain from certain
activities. 24 Consequently, interpretations of the Code by disciplinary com-

13. See Ashman, supra note 9, at 398. The provisions of the Code were also reluctantly
enforced in its early years, if it was enforced at all. The reluctance or refusal by courts to
enforce restrictions on judicial conduct have largely vanished in the past twenty years. Id. at
399.
14. 422 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1966).
15. Id.at 205.
16. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics is an ambiguously phrased predecessor
to Canon 7(A)(3) of the Code. See Ashman, supra note 9, at 398. Canon 7(A)(3) provides in
part: "A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate .
for a nonjudicial
office . . ." CODE, supra note 2, Canon 7(A)(3).
17. 422 P.2d 203, 208 (Okla. 1966) (Halley, C.J., dissenting).
18. McKay, supra note 10, at 391.
19. The Code's drafters rejected a suggestion that the provisions be hortatory as opposed
to binding. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 43.
20. McKay, supra note 10, at 391.
21. See generally I.TESTITOR & D. SINKs, JUDICIAL CONDUCT OROANIZATIONS (2d ed.
1980) (comprehensive tables listing judicial disciplinary organizations, structures, and procedures); Note, A FirstAmendment Right of Access to Judicial DisciplinaryProceedings, 132 U.
PA. L. Rav. 1163, 1165-66 n.26 (1984) (list of all state statutes and constitutional provisions
establishing judicial conduct organizations).
22. I. TESTITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 21, at 1-9.
23. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 43.
24. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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missions and state and federal courts which review or enforce judicial
discipline have often failed to establish consistent or discernable standards
to address controversial conduct.
II.

SCOPE OF CONDUCT REGULATED

By

THE CODE

The Code has been widely adopted 25 and affects almost all aspects of a
judge's public and private life. 26 Much of the emphasis of the Code is on
off-bench, 27 nonofficial behavior. 21 Canon 1 sets the tone of the Code; it is
a general admonition applicable to all conduct. Canon 2's concern with the
"appearance of impropriety" serves as the ultimate standard by which all
off-bench activities are gauged. 29 Canon 3 establishes the priority of official

25. The Model Code has been adopted essentially in full by forty-six states. Four states
have adopted the Code in part, or have adopted their own standards to govern judicial conduct.
Those states are Maryland, Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Lubet, Judicial Ethics and
Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 983, 983 n.5 (1985). See D. FRETZ, R. PEOPLES & T. WICKER,
ETHICS FOR JUDGES 6 (1982) (detailed guide to the modifications of the Model Code made by
the various states). Illinois is the most recent state to adopt the Model Code. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 61-67 (1987). Illinois was one of the few states that revised or adopted
new rules of judicial conduct prior to the promulgation of the Model Code by the ABA. See
Law of March 15, 1970, ch. l10A, paras. 61-67, 1970 (repealed 1987). The committee commentary accompanying the adoption of the Model Code in Illinois explained that the adoption
of the ABA Canons (Code) would work no substantive changes in existing law, but would ease
the administration of judicial discipline in two ways: (1) by achieving uniformity with rules in
effect in other states, and (2) by providing a body of interpretative decisions to assist in the
application of the rules in particular factual situations. COMMITTEE COMMENTARY, ILL. SUP. CT.
& APP. CT. COMBINED ADVANCE SHEETS, Dec. 10, 1986 - No. 24, 9, 10.
26. See LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAHYDICiAL AcTrTvITES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES (1984); Goldstein, Fundraising by Judges: Ethical
Restrictions on Assisting Civic, Charitable, and Other Organizations, 8 JuD. CONDUCT REP. 1
(1986); Lubet, supra note 25; Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Non-Official Conduct: A
Survey and Critique of the Law, 10 BALT. L. REV. 225 (1981); Shaman, Off-The-Bench Conduct,
54 PA. BAR A.Q. 24 (1986); Shaman & Reiter, Off-The-Bench Speech, 8 JUD. CONDUCT REP.
1 (1986).
In In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 71, 306 N.E.2d 203, 234-35 (1973), the Massachusetts Supreme
Court defined the scope of conduct that could be reached under an ethical code as follows:
It is to be remembered that [a judge's] service and its quality are to be gauged not
only by their scholarship in the law ... but in their public utterances . . . , and in
their strict adherence to the Code of Judicial Conduct ....
[Even in his private
life] subjected as he is to constant public scrutiny in his community and beyond
... [miore is expected of him and, since he is a judge, rightfully so ....
He
cannot thus ... engage in some public expressions, some pleasurable diversions,
and in some social contacts which are open to others.
27. This Comment will use the term off-bench to refer generally to quasi-judicial, extrajudicial, and political activity. Any conduct not directly related to a judge's official duties is
off-bench conduct. Other writers have found the on/off bench distinction workable as well.
See supra note 26.
28. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 44.
29. See Canons 1 & 2, supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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duties and is the only provision which exclusively governs on-bench conduct.30

Canon 3 describes proper courtroom decorum, limits out-of-court commentary on pending cases and other publicity, requires diligent attention to
administrative duties, cautions against nepotism or favoritism, and broadly
advises disqualification where impartiality might be questioned under a
nonexclusive list of circumstances.3 1 Canon 4 regulates quasi-judicial activities
such as lecturing and writing on legal topics. 3 2 Canon 4 broadly condones

service, membership, and fund-raising for organizations; lecturing, writing,
speaking, and public appearances before executive and legislative agencies,

if related to the law, legal system, or administration of justice. 3 Canon 5
extensively limits vocational, civic, charitable, financial, fiduciary, and other
related activities.3 4 Overall, Canon 5 seeks to prevent the exploitation of
judicial office by judges, family members, business associates, and any

nonlegal organization. 35 Canon 6 requires disclosure of income derived from

the activities governed by Canons 4 and 5.36 Finally, Canon 7 governs the
37
political activities and campaign conduct of elected judges.

30. CODE, supra note 2. Canon 3 reads in part as follows:
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently.
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activities. His
judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law.
Canon 3 addresses some off-bench conduct. Canon 3(A)(6) limits off-bench conduct through
its prohibition on public commentary about pending or impending proceedings in any court,
with only a narrow exception for public explanation of court procedures. Id. See, e.g., In re
Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984) (judge disciplined for comments to newspaper regarding
contempt proceedings in his court). The Alabama Supreme Court noted that "judges walk a
fine line between the duties and prohibitions of Canon 3(A)(6) ... the risk of being misquoted
... tilt(s) the balance in favor of 'no comment.' " Id. at 355.
31. See CODE, supra note 2, Canon 3.
32. Id. Canon 4 reads in part as follows:
A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and
the Administration of Justice.
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may engage in
the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not cast doubt on his
capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities ....
33. See id.
34. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5. Canon 5 reads in part as follows:
A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of
Conflict with His Judicial Duties.
35. Id.

36.

CODE,

supra note 2.

37. Id. Most of Canon 7 is directed toward campaign activities by judges, undertaken
for their benefit or the benefit of other candidates for political office. Canon 7(A)(4) makes
an allowance for political activities under the same circumstances as Canon 4. Canon 7 varies
from state to state depending upon whether judges are elected or appointed, or variations
thereon. Canon 7 is probably the only Canon that has been substantively evaluated on an
empirical basis. See Volcansek, Codes of Judicial Ethics: Do They Affect Judges' Views of
Proper Off-the-Bench Behavior?, 17 Am. Bus. L.J. 493 (1980) (analysis of Canon 7's impact
since its adoption in 1974 on ethical viewpoints of Texas judges as reflected in responses to
questionnaires).
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The policy justifications for regulating off-bench behavior are outlined in
the Code itself. Among the reasons offered are: (1) protecting judicial
independence," (2) maintaining the appearance of impartiality and propriety,3 9 (3) avoiding distractions from judicial duties and conflicts of interest
that may cause frequent disqualification, 40 and (4) avoiding unfair exploitation of the judicial office. 41 Conduct which has been sanctioned under the
Code in furtherance of these goals includes: comments and letters to the
press, 42 activities on behalf of charitable, civic, or legal organizations,

of offensive language,"4 sexual affairs,
47
political activity.

4

43

use

business activities,4 and partisan

38. CODE, supra note 2, Canons 1, 5(G).
39. Id. Canons 2, 2(A), 3, 3(C), 4, 5(C)(1), 7.
40. Id. Canons 3, 4 (commentary), 5(A), 5(C)(1), 5(G).
41. Id. Canons 2, 5(A)(2), 5(C)(1).
42. See In re Tschirhart, Formal Complaint No. 32 (Mich. Jud. Ten. Comm'n June 28,
1985) (defiant and flippant comments to press); In re Mandeville, 144 Vt. 608, 481 A.2d 1048
(1984) (comments to newspaper regarding disposition in criminal trials violates Canon 7(A));
In re Fromer, Unreported Judgment (N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct Oct. 25, 1984) (comment
on pending rape case violated tenets of fairness and justice); State ex rel. Williams v. Graham,
No. CJTD 76-1 (Okla. Ct. Jud. 1976) (letter to press brought fellow judges into disrepute and
fostered controversy); In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972) (interview to
counter bad press reports held improper).
43. See In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, No. 86-2 (Jud. Council
D.C. Cir. June 26, 1986) (recruiting for bar association discouraged); In re Kaplan, Unreported
Determination (N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct May 17, 1983) (face-to-face solicitation of lawyers
for charitable contributions); Shilling v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 397,
415 N.E.2d 900, 434 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1980) (improper to seek preferential treatment for animal
shelter); see also Goldstein, supra note 26 (state and federal advisory opinions on soliciting
funds and members for varied organizations).
44. See In re Cerbone, 61 N.Y.2d 93, 460 N.E.2d 217, 472 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1984) (ethnic
epithets and slurs); In re Stevens, 31 Cal. 3d 403, 645 P.2d 99, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982) (racial
slurs and epithets in chambers); In re Kuehnel, 49 N.Y.2d 465, 403 N.E.2d 167, 426 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1980) (demeaning comments to ethnic group); Matter of Potter, No. 82 (Jud. Inquiry &
Rev. Bd. Docket No. 63 Pa. 1977) (racial slurs in statements to press); Canon v. Comm'n on
Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1975) (profanities
shouted at apartment manager and police).
45. See In re Hyland, No. ACJC 83-25 (N.J. Comm'n Jud. Conduct Sept. 25, 1985)
(sexual harassment and affair with secretary); Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10
Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973) (offensive sexual gestures to women in
chambers and elsewhere), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). See infra note 55.
46. See Inquiry Concerning a Judge, DeFoor, 494 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1986) (use of office
to market electronic device and assist political campaigns); In re Babineaux, 346 So. 2d 676
(La. 1977) (service on board of directors of financial institutions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977); In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642-43 (N.Y. Ct. Jud. 1978) (judges held interests
in securities subject to current litigation); In re Foster, 271 Md. App. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974)
(use of office to advance real estate deals, obtaining license in office).
47. See Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of State of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978) (failure to resign judicial office before seeking election to
nonjudicial governmental office); In re Davis, 249 Ga. 428, 291 S.E.2d 547 (1982) (participation
in mayoral election and recall campaign); Matter of Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1980)
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Given the breadth of conduct which can be reached under the Code, it is
imperative that the Code provide practical and comprehensive standards
which judges, disciplinary bodies, and the public may apply when judicial
conduct is questioned. 4 Additionally, the underlying aim of the Code to
maintain an independent and honorable judiciary 49 may be undercut if judges
are given insufficient guidance with respect to permissible conduct.5 0 Finally,
in the absence of tangible standards, the Code could be surreptitiously
manipulated by person seeking to control or gain influence over unpopular
or controversial judges.' The control of controversial judges may occur
internally through the courts, or externally through complaints brought by
special interest groups.

(contributions to and attendance at fundraising for governor, also encouraging other court
personnel to contribute time and funds); In re Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 333 N.E.2d 199 (1975)
(repeated attempts to make illegal campaign contributions); In re Schamel, 46 A.D.2d 236, 362
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1974) (repeated failure to resign judicial position before seeking other elective
governmental office); In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973) (serving as toastmaster
at dinner to honor candidate). See generally AM. JUDICATURE SOC., JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
DISABIITY DIGEST (1960-1978, 1979 Supp., 1980 Supp., and 1980-1985 Supp.) (comprehensive,
cross-indexed digest of judicial disciplinary decisions, listings by subject matter, Canons,
activities, and topics).
48. See Volcansek, supra note 37, at 505 (concluding that codification of more explicit
standards under the Code will resolve problem areas now left to judge's discretion). In the
Foreword to a Symposium on JudicialEthics, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 391, John Weistart observed
judges can reasonably demand that the prevailing formal statements of ethics assist judges in
structuring their lives. The decision to revise the Code was an admission that prior standards
were inadequate since they did not provide the guidance needed by judges. Id. at 391. The
Symposium was published just prior to the formal adoption of the Code by the American Bar
Association and includes articles by many of those persons involved in drafting the Code.
The Honorable Frank J. Battisti, Chief Judge of the United States District Court, Northern
District of Ohio, contends that federal judicial councils "are applying standards unknown or
unannounced beforehand to either the judge or the lawyers. [L]awyers and judges are being
evaluated on what are represented as legitimate standards. In reality they are not standards at
all, but merely arbitrary, personal or vague notions." Battisti, Remarks to the Akron Bar
Association, 18 AKRON L. REV. 353, 360 (1985).
49. Canon 1, supra note 4.
50. See Schoenbaum, A HistoricalLook at Judicial Discipline, 54 CM[-]IKENT L. REv.
1, 23 (1977) (concluding that an independent judiciary will not be attained so long as judges
are subject to removal on insubstantial or capricious grounds); Martineau, supra note 26, at
245.
51. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas once voiced his concern over the
potential loss of judicial independence through the use of judicial discipline to ride roughshod
over unpopular judges. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of United States,
398 U.S. 74, 136-41, reh'g denied, 399 U.S. 937 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Judge Chandler
had been suspended from all judicial duties for a failure to discharge the duties of his office
and the Supreme Court affirmed this sanction. Id. at 89. Judge Chandler refused to disqualify
himself from cases where there was a conflict of interest and engaged in litigation before the
court. Justice Black also dissented and expressed his fear that unless judicial discipline is
carefully controlled, "[t]he hope for an independent judiciary will prove to have been no more
than an evanescent dream." Id. at 143 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Definitive standards which address judicial misconduct have proven elusive
and difficult to attain." Blanket statements, rather than tangible, workable
standards are commonly offered by the courts as reasons for subjecting
judges to punishment. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court disciplined
a judge for his defiant and inappropriate "public comments regarding ...
controversial incidents concerning him . . ." to a news reporter. 3 The court
declared that the need to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, "requires
that a judge behave as if he were always on the bench."-' On the other
hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to discipline a judge charged
with, among other matters, a battery, and held that discipline is appropriate
only where off-bench conduct affects a judge in his official capacity or is
prohibited by law." The positions adopted by these courts are irreconcilable.
Each exemplifies opposing ends of the spectrum in the regulation of judicial
conduct. The first establishes a standard which leaves little room for offbench expression by imposing a rigid application of the Code. The second
approach places so few limits on off-bench conduct that judges may act
56
largely at their own discretion.
III.

LIMsTS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Like other public servants, judges may be required to sacrifice rights they
would otherwise enjoy.5 7 As the Supreme Court of Florida recently noted:

52. See generally Yankelewitz, State JudicialDisciplinary Commissions and Proceedings:
Developing Administrative and Legal Standards for Evaluating Judicial Misconduct, 10 RUT.CAm. L.J. 685, 698-704 (1979) (examination of various standards and their development through
application to instances of misconduct).
53. In re Tschirhart, 422 Mich. 1207, 1209, 371 N.W.2d 850, 852 (1985).
54. Id. at 1210, 371 N.W.2d at 852 (quoting In re Bennet, 403 Mich. 178, 199, 267
N.W.2d 914, 922 (1979)). Judge Tschirhart commented on challenges to his visit of a Nevada
brothel, criticized the local prosecutor's handling of a rape case, and promised to run for reelection so he could raise a little hell.
55. See In re Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 462, 397 A.2d 743, 758 (1979). Judge Dalessandro
gained notoriety for an extra-marital affair as well. The court noted that none of the conduct
was criminal under Pennsylvania law, and that moral beliefs and social norms were not
appropriate subjects of judicial discipline - they were matters for the ballot box. Id. at 460,
397 A.2d at 758-59. But cf Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d
477 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (judge disciplined for extra-marital affair since
his conduct, both official and personal, must conform to highest standard). See also In re
DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 812, 279 N.E.2d 296, 310 (1972) ("public gambling and being a
judge are incompatible," therefore, discipline appropriate even where judge legally gambled in
Las Vegas).
56. A middle ground between these extremes, but one that probably offers little guidance,
is the definition of misconduct offered by the New York Court of Appeals: "[A]ny conduct,
on or off the bench, inconsistent with proper judicial demeanor [which] subjects the judiciary
as a whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the individual judge to carry out his or
her constitutionally mandated function." Kuehnel v. State Comm'n of Judicial Conduct, 49
N.Y.2d 465, 469, 403 N.E.2d 167, 168, 426 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1980) (Judge Keuhnel physically
and verbally abused four youths he encountered in a parking lot and suspected of vandalism).
57. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld reasonable restrictions on
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Judges serve on the bench in order to further the interests of justice, not
their own personal interests. [A judge] must be willing to forego many of
the financial and political activities that otherwise might be available to
him. If an individual is unwilling to forego such opportunities, he should
not be a judge. 8

This statement reflects a widely accepted proposition that judges are in a
class by themselves, set apart from other public officials, and the public has

a "legitimate" and "proper" concern with regard to a judge's private life.5 9
The Code's restrictions on extrajudicial activities seek to strike a balance
between the competing interests of judicial accountability and judicial independence. 60 In order to achieve this goal, the Code prohibits conduct which
would be deemed acceptable if engaged in by the average citizen. 61 These
limitations are based on the belief that the public often fails to distinguish
between a judge's on-bench and off-bench conduct. 62 However, strict limitations on judicial behavior can have detrimental effects. Too many restrictions on a judge's off-bench life risks placing him in an ivory tower which
may diminish judicial ability.6 3 Justice Frankfurter once voiced an objection

the active participation of federal and state employees in partisan political activity. See, e.g.,
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1976) (upheld constitutionality of statute restricting state
employees' participation in partisan political activities); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947) (upheld federal statutes which prohibited federal employees from taking part in
political management or in political campaigns). Likewise, the Supreme Court has upheld
restrictions on governmental employees' speech. See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983) (upheld limitations on public employees' rights to free speech to effectuate the state's
efficiency of public services through its employees); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (held that in determining rights of public employees, it is necessary to balance the interest
of the employee as a citizen and the interest of the state or federal government).
58. Inquiry Concerning A Judge, DeFoor, 494 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 1986). The court
reprimanded the judge for actively campaigning for local politicians, a violation of Canon 7,
and for promoting through his court an electronic device in which he had a financial interest,
a violation of Canons 2, 3 and 5.
59. See, e.g., Rifkind, A Judge's Nonjudicial Behavior, 38 N.Y. STATE B.J. 22 (1966)
(adapted from an address to the American Bar Association Section of Judicial Administration,
Aug. 9, 1965). Judge Rifkind examines the benefits and detriments of political, nonpartisan
political, and community activity by judges, and offers some guidelines: extrajudicial activity
should be as circumscript as possible and devoted to the highest ideals, the higher the court
the tighter the restrictions, and the occasions a judge takes to participate should be rare. He
concludes that a sufficient degree of isolation is necessary to avoid suspicion that judicial
decisions are corrupted by passion, partisanship, or partiality. Id. at 28.
60. See Markey, supra note 1, at 375-77.
61. As the Supreme Court of Vermont noted: "[T]he Canons... are standards measuring
fitness for judicial office and they therefore embrace tests of behavior relating to integrity and
propriety that condemn actions in which the average citizen can freely indulge without consequence." In re Mandeville, 144 Vt. 608, 608, 481 A.2d 1048, 1049 (1984) (citing In re Douglas,
135 Vt. 585, 592, 382 A.2d 215, 219 (1977)). Accord In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 71, 306 N.E.2d
203, 234-35 (1973).
62. See Kuehnel v. State Comm'n of Judicial Conduct, 49 N.Y.2d 465, 469, 403 N.E.2d
167, 168, 426 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (1980).
63. Shaman, Off-The-Bench Conduct, 54 PA. BAR A. Q. 24, 26 (1986).
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to regulations which served "to protect the court as a mystical entity or the
judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community
and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are

exposed.'

'

The control of judicial conduct is grounded in a desire to secure public
respect and confidence in the judiciary." Alexander Hamilton once stated that
"the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments
of power ... all possible care is necessary to enable it to defend itself
....
"9 The perception of the judiciary as the weakest and most vulnerable
branch of government has led to the imposition of strict restrictions on
judicial conduct. The argument proceeds that any power the judiciary holds
derives from respect given its decisions, 67 and that respect derives from public
trust in the impartiality of the court's decisions. 6 Therefore, even the
appearance of impropriety erodes confidence in a judge's impartiality.6 9 The
result, as Judge Markey has noted, is that "[tihe appearance of justice is
seen today not as separate, but as an integral part of justice itself." 70
In order to maintain the appearance of justice and assure public confidence
in the judiciary, many courts demand strict adherence to ethical codes. 7' For
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a judge's constitutional
challenge to Rule 17 of the Wisconsin Judicial Code of Ethics 72 and stated:
"A lack of confidence in the integrity of the courts rocks the very foundations
of organized society, promotes unrest and dissatisfaction, and even encour-

64. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
Ashman, supra note 9, at 409.
65. Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69-70 (1970); Canon 2 commentary, supra note 5.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton
observes that "[t]he judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the
purse .... It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment
.... " Id. at 465 (emphasis in original). Judge Kaufman notes that the late Professor Bickel
relied on the foregoing observations of Hamilton in his theory of judicial restraint as set out
in A. BICkEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Kaufman, Chilling JudicialIndependence,
supra note 6, at 684 n.18.
67. See Rifkind, supra note 59, at 23.
68. Id. See In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 667 (N.Y. Ct. Jud. 1978) (Simons, J.,
dissenting); Lubet, supra note 25, at 986.
69. See Canon 2, supra note 5, commentary.
70. Markey, supra note 1, at 380. See J. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE

(1972).
71. See In re Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11, 16-17, 313 N.E.2d 878, 881-82 (1974); In re
Mandeville, 144 Vt. 608, 609, 481 A.2d 1048, 1049 (1985).
72. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975). Rule 17 requires that judges
file an annual report of assets and liabilities. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256-4 (West 1978). The Kading
court rejected the argument that the law was overbroad and an invasion of privacy. The court
found the rule reasonable in light of the compelling state interest of informing the public of
economic interests which could reflect adversely on a judge's impartiality. Kading, 70 Wis. at
525-30, 235 N.W.2d at 416-19.
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Although the Wisconsin court's language is extreme, it

reflects the prevailing response to charges of judicial misconduct. 74 Perhaps,
interpretations of the Code consistent with this perspective have extended
the Code to conduct not contemplated by its drafters.
A.

Intermeddling With Legislative And Executive Branches As A Threat

To Judicial Independence
The justification for the separation of judges from much of the social and
political sphere is derived from the important state interest in an independent
judiciary. 7" An independent judiciary is necessary to secure the separation
of powers on which our government is founded.76 Likewise, separation may
assure the independence of the judiciary.7 7 The authors of the Federalist

Papers argued that when judicial power is joined with the executive or
legislative power, life and liberty would be exposed to arbitrary control under

the former, and the judge might behave as an oppressor in the latter. 7s The
Federal Constitution does not limit a judge's involvement with the other

73. Kading, 70 Wis. at 524, 235 N.W.2d at 416 (quoting In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602,
620, 214 N.W. 379, 385 (1927)). See In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569-70 (Fla. 1970) (variation
on the same warning), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 962, reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971).
74. See Volcansek, supra note 37, at 505; Markey, supra note 1, at 374; Shilling v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 397, 409, 415 N.E.2d 900, 905, 434 N.Y.S.2d 909,
915 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (majority's decision goes beyond post-Watergate public
image syndrome), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 978 (1981).
75. In Babineaux v. Judiciary Comm'n, 341 So. 2d 396 (La. 1976), the court rejected a
first amendment challenge to the Canon 5(C)(2) limitation on financial activities. In stressing
the compelling state interest, the court referred to former Supreme Court Chief Justice Parker's
statement that:
[t]he judge must not only be independent - absolutely free of all influence and
control so that he can put into his judgments the honest, unfettered and unbiased
judgment of his mind but he must be so freed of business, political and financial
connections and obligations that the public will recognize that he is independent.
Id. at 402-03 (quoting Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 20 TENN. L. Rav. 703,
705-06 (1949)).
76. Public remarks in November, 1981 by Justice Berger of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia expressing his opposition to proposed constitutional amendments led to public
criticism and official investigations. Mr. Berger was eventually censured for his remarks. See
Webber, The Limits to Judges' Free Speech: A Comment on the Report of the Committee of
Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr. Justice Berger, 29 McGI L.J. 369, 371-72
(1984). Jeremy Webber explores the balance of power between the branches of government and
the effect of judicial commentary on the separation of powers doctrine. He concludes that the
threat to the separation of powers is insignificant in comparison to the benefits from judicial
speech. Id. at 375-89. The article is valuable in that the Canadian and American judiciary have
shared historical and doctrinal underpinnings. Webber relies on United States Supreme Court
cases as well as the writings of Alexander Hamilton in his analysis.
77. McKay, supra note 10, at 391.
78. J. Madison, quoting Montesquieu's De L'Espirit Des Lois in Ti FEDE a.IST No.
47, at 303 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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branches of government while acting outside his official duties, 79 but many
state constitutions have specific provisions prohibiting judicial involvement
with the executive or legislative branches. 0 However, even these provisions
do not address the myriad of activities a judge may undertake which may
indirectly, yet substantially, influence political and social issues.
The Code does not explicitly rely on the separation of powers doctrine,
but Canon 5(g) does limit extrajudicial service in nonjudicial governmental
positions." The commentary following Canon 5(g) justifies the restriction as

a means of preserving judicial energies and independence, and as a means
to prevent judicial involvement in controversial matters. 2 Ultimately, the
Code's all-encompassing admonition against even the appearance of impropriety in all activities has a broader reach than any constitutional limitation.
Regardless of the accepted rationale, judges participation in legislative or

administrative policy-making raises serious concerns about the impartial
performance of judicial duties in later statutory interpretation or constitutional adjudication.

3

Of course, the separation of a judge from legislative

and executive activities does not mean that judges will not have strong
84
political views which are at odds with the law they must interpret and apply.
5
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re Gridley underscores the
difficulty presented by the desire to maintain the appearance of impartiality.

State Circuit Court Judge Gridley had expressed his opposition to Florida's

79. See Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers,
49 CONN. B.J. 391, 408-10 (1975). Slonim persuasively discredits the principle of the separation
of powers as a limit on, or basis for, judicial discipline of extrajudicial activities. He concludes
that an individual's involvement with another branch of government does not violate the
principle. Only when the court, as an institution, interferes with the other branches is the
separation of powers principle operative. See generally Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial
Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1970) (historical discussion of judicial independence). But see Dalton, Off the Bench and Into the Mire: Judging ExtrajudicialBehavior
(Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 1708, 1722-23 (1982). Dalton perceives a threat to the structure
of our government when judges undertake active roles in legislative drafting and lobbying.
80. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(a), (b).
81. CODE, supra note 2. Canon 5(G) provides in part:
Extra-judicial Appointments, A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental ...

position that is concerned with issues ...

other than the improvement

of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
82. Commentary to Canon 5(G) reads in part:
The appropriateness of conferring these assignments on judges must be reassessed,
however, in light of the demands on judicial manpower.., and the need to protect
the courts from [matters that may be] controversial. Judges should not be expected
or permitted to accept governmental appointments that could interfere with the
effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.
83. See Nathanson, The Extra-Judicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices: Where
Should the Line be Drawn? (Book Review), 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 494, 521-25 (1983).
84. There is a significant difference between a statement that a judge will dismiss all
divorce cases since he disagrees with the law, and a statement that the laws should be changed
in the public interest. E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 74.
85. 417 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1982).
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capital punishment laws through letters published in the local newspapers 6
The court noted that although the conduct was close to the dividing line
between appropriate and inappropriate conduct, the comments did not cause
disrespect for the. law or judicial office, interfere with official duties, or
diminish public confidence in the judiciary. 7 Accordingly, the court found
no violation of Canons 2(a) or 5(a) of the Code since the judge had been
careful to make clear that he would follow the law as written.88 The court
refrained from disciplining Judge Gridley for publicly expressing an opinion
which he had every right to hold.
The Gridley court's reasoning echoes the sentiment of Judge Edwards of
the District of Columbia Circuit Court who asserts that judges can and do
keep their personal views and their official duties separate. 9 Judge Edwards
argues that "it is the law-and not the personal politics of individuals-that
controls judicial decision making . . . ."9 A final limit on judicial incursion
into the other branches of government may be, as Justice Holmes once
stated, that "judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially, they are confined from molar to molecular motions."'"
Justice Douglas once expressed his fear that judicial independence would
suffer when discipline is used to control nonconformist judges. 92 The control
of controversial or politically active judges may be possible through application of specific Code restrictions to off-bench activity, but amorphous
standards like the appearance of impropriety and the promotion of public
confidence, which apply to all activities, often are the backbone of decisions
to discipline judges.93 The dilemma presented by these amorphous standards
is that they are essentially subjective and immeasurable concepts. The question of whether or not conduct violates these standards can shift with time,
public sentiment, the viewpoint of the parties bringing a complaint, the

86. Judge Gridley expressed his views on Christian forgiveness and his disagreement with
the imposition of the death penalty. Judge Gridley was disciplined though for other actions he
took in response to a criminal defendant's mother's pleas for assistance. Id. at 954-55.
87. Id.

88. Id. Canon 5(A) provides that a judge may speak, write, lecture, and teach on nonlegal
subjects so long as it does not detract from the dignity of his office or interfere in his duties.
See CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5(A).
89. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning The "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling
Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 619, 621 (1985).
90. Id. at 620.
91. O.W. HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW, COLLECTED LEoAL PAPERS 167, 194 (1920).
92. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
93. See Canon 2, supra note 5. In addition to the Code, many states have adopted
statutory and constitutional provisions to regulate judicial conduct. A representative constitutional provision sanctions "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute." CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(c) (1980). The similarity of such
provisions to Canons 1 and 2 of the Code should be obvious. These provisions are applied
concurrently with, and in much the same manner as, Canons 1 and 2. See Martineau, supra
note 26, at 229.
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B.

Judicial Uncertainty As To Permissible Conduct

The courts have generally rejected judges' claims that they cannot be
certain when they have violated vague and arbitrary ethical standards which
are based on appearances alone. General or broad standards have been found
neither improper nor unenforceable. 95 Courts have espoused reliance on an
objective standard 96 and case-by-case9 7 analysis when applying these flexible
ethical standards. The approach of the Supreme Court of Maryland is
representative of the refusal to cabin general ethical standards with precise
definitions. In In re Diener,98 the Maryland court acknowledged:
Precisely what conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice
is or may be, in any or all circumstances, we shall not undertake to say.
Indeed, a comprehensive, universally applicable definition may never evolve
but it is unlikely that we shall ever have much trouble recognizing and
identifying such conduct whenever the constituent facts are presented. 9
The California Supreme Court in Geiler v. Commission on JudicialQualifications,100 described "prejudicial conduct" as conduct which an objective
observer would find unjudicial, prejudicial to public esteem for judicial
office, or conduct that casts the judicial office into disrepute.10' None of the
three foregoing descriptions is particularly definite, yet each fairly reflects
the language of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code. 0 2

94. See Hall, Judicial Removal For Off-Bench Behavior: Why?, 21 J. Pus. L. 127, 14647 (1972); Rifkind, supra note 59, at 28.
95. See Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (D.D.C. 1977); Kaiser v. Bell, 332
F. Supp. 608, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. I11.
1970).
96. In Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110

Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1977), the California Supreme Court stated
that 'It]he first two Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct . .. emphasize the importance
of appraising alleged judicial conduct objectively rather than subjectively." Id. at 281, 515
P.2d at 8, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 208. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied a reasonable
person standard, which is somewhat objective, for determining the effect of a judge's conduct
on the public. See In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 469, 318 A.2d 523, 533 (1974).
97. See In re Karns, No. 80-CC-4, 1, 5 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Dec. 17, 1982) (inherently
vague ethical restrictions require case-by-case analysis to determine violation); In re Diener, 268
Md. 659, 733, 304 A.2d 587, 624-25 (1973) (Barnes, J., dissenting) (whether "conduct [is]
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" requires case-by-case factual determinations),
/
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
98. 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587, (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (41974).
99. Id. at 671, 304 A.2d at 594. Justice Barnes argued that the majority had eft dangling
the meaning of the phrase "conduct prejudicial .... " and he argued fbr a more precise
definition. Id. at 733, 304 A.2d at 624-25 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
100. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1977).
101. Id. at 284, 515 P.2d at 9, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 209.

102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Courts have repeatedly rejected challenges to ethical codes of conduct on
due process and vagueness grounds. 10 3 Likewise, courts have rejected first
amendment challenges to the Code as violating a judges speech and associational rights. 104 In summary, the Code regulates conduct which shakes public
confidence in the judiciary and thereby threatens judicial independence. The
Code achieves this by regulating both actual and apparent impropriety. Given
the flexible nature of the Code, its value as a guide to behavior lies in its
application to specific instances of controversial conduct and the standards
that can be fairly derived from factually specific decisions.
IV.

JuDIciAL DISCIPLINE FOR INVOLVEMENT IN CONTROVERSIAL ToPics

Little guidance can be gleaned from the cases in which a judge is disciplined
for public comment. A pre-Code case from Florida, In re Kelly, 0 is representative of the risk of discipline a controversial judge may encounter.
Judge Kelly, the presiding judge of Florida's Sixth Judicial Circuit, instituted
immediate and massive reforms in circuit court procedures. The other circuit
judges objected to the reforms and Judge Kelly ultimately resigned under
their concerted pressure.' °0 Judge Kelly then filed a petition with the Clerk
of the Court which contained "suggested court reforms and criticism of
court administration," and publicized his actions through press releases and
other public commentary. 07 The Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded Judge Kelly for "conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary." 0°
The discipline in Kelly could easily have fallen within the ambit of Canons
I and 2 of the Code which are simply more comprehensively written analogs
of the standard Judge Kelly violated.' °9 The court characterized Judge Kelly's
actions as an "effort to pamper the public" and "bolster his public image
at the expense of the judiciary."" 0 Chief Justice Ervin, dissenting, rejected

103. The standards are "[no] more nebulous or less objective than the reasonable and
prudent man test which has been part of our negligence law for centuries." In re Foster, 271
Md. 449, 476, 318 A.2d 523, 537 (1974).
104. See Babineaux v. Judiciary Comm'n, 341 So. 2d 396, 402 (La. 1976) (restrictions on
associational rights reasonably necessary to meet state interest); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542
P.2d 676 (1975) (judge's right to speak freely is circumscribed by the Code). But cf. In re
Stevens, 31 Cal. 3d 403, 645 P.2d 99, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (judicial
discipline should not trammel speech rights). See also Mosk & Fortier, Should Judges Speak
Out? Yes/No, 24 JUDGES J. 42 (Summer 1985) (authors express their opposing views as to
judicial free speech). The Code and other limitations on political speech in judicial election
campaigns have engendered first amendment challenges. See generally Ashman, supra note 9;
Comment, First Amendment Rights of Judges in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47 OHIo ST.
L.J. 201 (1986).
105. 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970).
106. Id. at 567.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 574.
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
110. 238 So. 2d at 566.
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the majority's contention that Judge Kelly's actions were motivated by
personal vanity."' Justice Ervin argued that Judge Kelly had the right, if
not the duty, to criticize perceived deficiencies in the court system.1 2 The
Chief Justice concluded that the public would suffer if judges must restrict
their comments to "uncritical banalities," that the decision trammeled first
amendment rights, and would lead to a "timorous lot of judges lacking
independence .
*...
-. 3Had the Code been in effect, the conduct may have
been condoned under Canon 4(a) as activities to improve the administration
of justice. However, consistent with the court's opinion, Judge Kelly's
"unbecoming conduct" would still violate the general standards of Canons
1 and 2, such that Canon 4 would probably have been of no avail to him.
In In re Bonin, 14 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts suspended
and censured Chief Judge Bonin of the Massachusetts Superior Court following his attendance at a controversial public lecture." 5 Gore Vidal was the
featured speaker of the lecture entitled "Sex and Politics in Massachusetts. '"" 6 Proceeds from ticket sales were to benefit a group of criminal
defendants indicted for their alleged involvement with an illicit homosexual
sex ring."17 The cases were then pending before the superior court, but not
before Judge Bonin."" Judge Bonin was photographed after the lectures with
Gore Vidal and the newspapers ran the following headline with the photograph, "Bonin at benefit for sex defendants."" 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that Judge Bonin
violated Canon 2(A) in that his conduct impugned public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. In addition, Judge Bonin's conduct
violated Canon 5(B) since his extrajudicial activities reflected adversely on
his impartiality through his exposure to "one-sided statements and argumentation on matters before his court."' 20 The court noted that ordinarily,
a judge would be free to attend a public lecture on such topics, but this
situation was distinguishable since the cases were pending before his (the
superior) court.' 2'

111. Id. at 575 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
112. Id.at 577.
113. Id.
114. 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978).
115. Id.at 711-12, 378 N.E.2d at 685.
116. Id.at 685, 378 N.E.2d at 672.
117. Id. at 687, 378 N.E.2d at 673.
118. Id. at 685, 378 N.E.2d at 672.
119. Id. at 701, 378 N.E.2d at 680.
120. Id. at 707, 378 N.E.2d at 683. Service on behalf of civic and charitable activities are
permitted under Canon 5(B), but Canon 5(B)(1) admonishes, "[A] judge should not serve if it
is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before
him or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court." CODE, supra note 2,
Canon 5(B). It would take a stretch of logic to find that Judge Bonin's attendance at the
lecture was service on behalf of a civic or charitable organization within the prohibition of
Canon 5(B)(1). Cf. infra note 122.
121. 375 Mass. at 708, 378 N.E.2d at 683.
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In retrospect, Judge Bonin probably should have chosen a less controversial
course of conduct, but his censure has been criticized as an extension of
"caution beyond the point of reasonable application.'

' 22

Judge Bonin's

public association with a controversial topic-homosexuality-was apparently enough to shake public confidence in his impartiality. Judge Bonin's
short tenure as Chief Judge has also been attributed to his proposed court
reforms. 2 As Sidney Blumenthal observed, Judge Bonin's career was shortened because he "had stumbled into a maze of political ambitions, petty
24
privileges, cronyism, homosexual indictments and media sensationalism."'
His proposed reforms were relatively mild, but they threatened many political
interests. 25 Regardless of the justifications offered, this case clearly demonstrates the potential of the Code as a basis for discipline of controversial
conduct.
The Bonin and Kelly cases demonstrate how the Code and similar restrictions on judicial propriety can be employed to discipline controversial judges.
The only discernable standard in these cases is that judges associated with
controversies lessen the public's confidence in the judiciary. The concern
with controversial conduct has led to the use of the Code to prevent judges
from expressing views on politically charged issues. Although many offbench activities may embroil a judge in controversy, politically oriented offbench activities are perhaps the most problematical.

26

A. Judicial Involvement In Political Issues
A judge may run afoul of permissible judicial activity through involvement
with politically charged issues. Canon 4 allows judges to speak, write, teach,
122. Lubet, supra note 25, at 1006. Lubet observes that the Bonin court relied on the fact
that Judge Bonin's attendance at the meeting entrenched on matters pending before his court
in violation of Canon 3(A)(6). Lubet further notes that abstention was unnecessary since Judge
Bonin had not "commented" on pending matters, at least in the usual sense of the word.
Additionally, the cases to which the meeting was directed were not scheduled to come before
Judge Bonin. The attendance at the meeting may have led some members of the public to infer
that he supported the criminal defendant's cause, but it may just as well have been motivated
by curiosity or interest in the speaker, Gore Vidal. Id.
123. Blumenthal, There Goes The Judge, 7 STUD. LAW. 21, 51 (Nov. 1978). Bonin ordered
court house workers, patronage employees, to change their long entrenched work habits. Id.
at 23. The greatest threat posed by Bonin was the change in procedures that had allowed the
District Attorney control over the assignment of judges and scheduling of cases, a power which
Bonin threatened. Id. at 21-23.
124. Id. at 21. Blumenthal chronicles the incidents and political maneuverings that accompanied Judge Bonin's rapid rise and fall in public service. "Bonin's overriding offense was
being an outsider in a system tightly controlled by insiders." Id. at 51.
125. Id. at 51.
126. The debate over the legislative lobbying and other political intrigues of the late
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter exemplifies the controversial nature of judicial involvement
in politics. See B. Mui, stY, THE BRANDEiS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982); Murphy, Elements of Extrajudicial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles of Justices Brandeis and
Frankfurter, 69 GEo. L.J. 101 (1980) (includes discussion of political activities of Justices Fortas
and Burger); Nathanson, The Extra-judicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices: Where Should
The Line Be Drawn? (Book Review), 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494 (1983); Dalton, Off the Bench
and Into the Mire: Judging Extrajudicial Behavior (Book Review), 91 YAILa L.J. 1708 (1982).

19871

OFF-BENCH EXPRESSIONS

and participate in legally related activities as long as the judge's ability to
decide cases impartially is not impaired. 127 Canon 5(A) allows the same
activities with respect to nonlegal topics so long as such involvement does
not interfere with the dignity of the court, entrench on judicial duties, or
present potential for disqualification from cases that may come before the
judge.128
Despite these provisions which allow for judicial community involvement,
Pennsylvania Common Pleas Judge Lisa Richette was advised by the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board not to make her planned speech
on the legal system in Nicaragua at a lawyer's forum on U.S. Central
American policy. 129 The Board's director stated that although the judicial
Canons did not prohibit such speech, Board guidelines discouraged judges
from speaking on controversial topics. 130 Judge Richette's speech arguably
fell outside of Canon 4 since it did not directly concern the American legal
system. However, such an interpretation would effectively encompass any
comparative and international legal issues. It could be argued that the speech
was outside Canon 5 as well since speeches on controversial topics may
"detract from the dignity of [her] office . . . .'"" Finally, the speech may
32
have fallen within the prohibition of political activities under Canon 7(A)(4).1
However, none of these provisions fits the activity involved so as to provide
a guide to other judges. Ultimately, the director's comments display a
disregard for whatever free speech rights a judge may have. 3 3 On the other
hand, the Pennsylvania Board's order characterizes the position of many
judicial disciplinary commissions which may otherwise rely on vague notions
1 34
of propriety and impartiality to obscure the basis of their decisions.
The controversy over District of Columbia Circuit Court Judge Abner
Mikva's activities on behalf of the American Bar Association's Individual
Rights and Responsibilities section further demonstrates the inherent difficulty in applying the Code to quasi-political activity. 3 The Washington

127. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4(A). See generally Tate, The Propriety of Off-Bench
Judicial Writing or Speaking on Legal or Quasi-Legal Issues, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 17 (1978)
(examining pros and cons of off-bench commentary and how it can be effectively employed to
affect changes that could not be easily done in an official capacity due to the limitations
inherent in official court opinions).
128. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5(A).
129. Her Talk Blocked, Judge Ponders Suit, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 3, col. 3.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
132. See infra note 150.
133. The City Council of Philadelphia passed a resolution asking the Board to rescind its
"order" and stated that "judges are not excluded from First Amendment rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, nor should the public be deprived of hearing important information." Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 3, col. 3. See In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 577 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting) (judicial discipline should not censor free speech on matters of public concern).
134. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
135. Judge Mikva's off-bench activities and the charges of judicial misconduct filed against
him prompted a debate over the differing treatment of "liberal" judges like Mikva, and the
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filed a complaint which alleged that Judge Mikva's

activities as chairman of the ABA section "compromise the appearance of
his impartiality by identifying him with the controversial aims of the section. 1 13 7 The Council's decision noted that chairmanship of bar association
committees is encouraged under Canon 4(C),' 3s but advised that the judge
should terminate his involvement with the section's recruitment efforts.

39

Judge Mikva characterized his recruitment efforts as being "exactly modeled on a political campaign," and as "a battle for the soul of the American

Bar Association."'

4
0

Judge Mikva sought to recruit women, minority, and

politically liberal lawyers into the bar organization. 4' Although the Council

determined that Judge Mikva did not violate the Code, he voluntarily ceased
his recruitment efforts, and pledged to abide by the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct.' 42 Ultimately, the Committee
was unable, for lack of full information, to determine whether or not Judge
Mikva might appropriately continue as chairman or engage in the contested
activities. "41
Significantly, the Mikva case demonstrates how the Code may be employed
by special interest groups to challenge a controversial judge's off-bench
activities. Merely by filing a complaint, a judge may be threatened with

sanctions and discipline, and perhaps be unjustly intimidated where no actual
impropriety has been demonstrated. Even if Judge Mikva's activities were
characterized as political, they may have been permissible under Canon

7(A)(4) which allows political activity directed toward legal reform.'" Judge
Mikva's off-bench conduct could be viewed as an honorable effort to improve

scrutiny to which "conservative" judicial nominees to the federal bench had been subjected.
See An Apology, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, f986, at 28, col. 1; Asides, Wall St. J., July 17, 1986,
at 24, col. 1; Judicial Restraint, Wall St. J., July 11, 1986, at 20, col. 1; A U.S. Judge's
Campaign for the "Soul" of the ABA," Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. I [hereinafter
Judge's Campaign].
136. The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) has been characterized as "ultra-conservative." Judge Mikva and the ABA, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 29, col. 1. In 1985, the
WLF brought a suit against the ABA for its role in passing on judicial qualifications. The
WLF alleged that this role was being abused to block the placement of "conservative" judges
on the federal bench. Id.
137. In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Judge Abner Mikva, No. 86-2
(Jud. Coun. D.C. Cir. June 26, 1986).
138. Id. at n.2."The judge must of course avoid any involvement that might place his
impartiality in doubt." Id. (quoting E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 76).
139. In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Judge Abner Mikva, No. 86-2
(Jud. Coun. D.C. Cir. June 26, 1986). The decision does not indicate the basis of this advisement
beyond the fact that the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct recommended it.
140. Judge's Campaign, supra note 135.
141. Id.
142. In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Judge Abner Mikva, No. 86-2
(Jud. Coun. D.C. Cir. June 26, 1986).
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
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the legal system.145 On the other hand, as former Supreme Court Chief
Justice Stone once warned, "[G]ossip about political activities within the
Court

. .

.is injurious to the Court .

.

.

."14

Canon 7 is the Code's attempt

to limit judicial involvement in political issues and reflects a bias toward
Justice Stone's philosophy.
B.

47

Recent Off-Bench Involvement In Political Issues-Two Opposing
Views

Most of Canon 7's provisions 4s and the Reporter's Notes 49 are directed
toward partisan political activities. Canon 7 apparently bans all political
activity outside of that necessary to gain election to judicial office. 50 However, Canon 7(A)(4) provides an exception, analogous to Canon 4,51 which
encourages limited "political" activity.5 2 Two recent cases have taken widely
divergent approaches to nonpartisan political activity under Canon 7. In In
re Norma Randolph,' the New Jersey Supreme Court held that not only
partisan activity, but any issue-oriented activity was impermissible under
Canon 7.114 However, in In re Staples,' the Washington Supreme Court
interpreted Canon 7(A)(4) such that only partisan political activities were
prohibited.' 56 These two courts' interpretations obviously are at odds with

145. As Justice Holmes once stated: "[Llaw is the business to which my life is devoted,
and I should show less than devotion if I did not do what lies in me to improve it." O.W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL, PAPERS 167, 194 (1920).
146. Mason, Extrajudicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1953) (quoting Letter to William Allen White, Dec. 1939). Justice Stone
continued: "[W]hen that occurs, everything the victim does or writes becomes suspect, and the
institution .. .is damaged in its reputation and influence." Id.

147. See E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 97.
148. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 7.
149. See E.W. THODE, supra note 4, at 95-100; supra note 44. See also In re Hayden, 41
N.J. 443, 197 A.2d 353 (1964) (any partisan political activity raises suspicions about judge's
impartiality).
150. CODE, supra note 2. Canon 7(A)(4) reads as follows:
A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of
measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
Canon 5(B) warns judges to refrain from civic and charitable activities where the organization
is conducted for the political advantage of its members. The commentary to Canon 5(B) warns
that a judge should not affiliate with organizations which make policy decisions that may have
political significance. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5.
151. See Canon 4, supra note 32.
152. Canon 7(A)(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges is the
federal counterpart to the Model Code's Canon 7(A)(4). It explicitly states that a judge should
refrain from political activity, "provided, however, this should not prevent a judge from
engaging in the activities described in Canon 4." Id.
153. 101 N.J. 425, 502 A.2d 533, cert. denied, Randolph v. Supreme Court of New Jersey,
106 S. Ct. 2289 (1986).
154. Id. at 437, 502 A.2d at 539.
155. 105 Wash. 2d 905, 719 P.2d 558 (1986).
156. Id. at 910, 719 P.2d at 561.
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one another and present judges with a dilemma in states where the extent
of permissible political activity is still open to interpretation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court adheres to the position that Canon 7
should be vigorously enforced and every precaution must be taken to assure
the separation of judges from either direct or indirect political activity.5 7 In
Randolph,'5" the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a ban on membership
in both governmental and private organizations which advocate or support
social, political, or legislative issues. Although the case involved the activities
of a court attendant, the court stated that the appearance of neutrality it

sought to maintain applied to judges as well as all court personnel. 5 9 Ms.
Randolph was a member of a county health board, a youth guidance council,

a citizens group,160 a homeowners association, and the NAACP. 6' The court
held that all of the activities violated the ban on political activity since they
posed: "A realistic likelihood of (1) involving judicial activities in important
and recurring public issues that are frequently the subject of political controversy; (2) giving the impression of judicial involvement in those issues;
and (3) creating the appearance of ... impartiality . ..."62

In justifying its decision, the Randolph court relied on restrictions on
governmental employee speech, 63 the separation of powers doctrine,'6 and

157. See, e.g., In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 351 A.2d 740 (1976) (relaxing previous total
ban on political activities of judges' spouses).
158. 101 N.J. 425, 502 A.2d 533.
159. Id. at 437, 502 A.2d at 539. New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 1:17-1 bans judges and
most court personnel from other elective office or political activity. Id. at 434-35, 502 A.2d at
538.
160. The Randolph court noted that these organizations were created by statutory authority
and that although none actually endorsed political candidates or engaged in partisan politics,
all were "deeply involved in the political activity of the community." Id. at 442-43, 502 A.2d
at 542.
161. Id. at 445, 502 A.2d at 544. The Randolph court noted that service with community
groups posed a likelihood for political conflict between competing community groups for scarce
public funds, and the NAACP's concern with civil rights and related matters placed her in the
midst of significant political and legislative controversies. Id. at 445-50, 502 A.2d at 544-46.
162. Id. at 427-28, 502 A.2d at 534.
163. The Randolph court reviewed U.S. Supreme Court decisions allowing restrictions on
government employee speech, and observed that they would balance the employee's free speech
rights against the substantial interest of the judiciary in operating without disruption. Id. at
430-33, 502 A.2d at 535-37.
164. The Randolph court noted:
That 'the complete independence of the courts is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution.' THE FEDERALIST No.. 78, at 484 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888);
that any 'lessening (of] the independence of the judiciary [attacks] ...the democratic republic itself.' A. de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 289 (Vintage
Books 1945) .... The judiciary seeks to advance these governmental interests by

its rule proscribing political activities by judicial employees.
Id. at 435-36, 502 A.2d at 538. See Rifkind, The Public Concern in a Judge's Private Life, 19

U. Cm. L. SCH. CONF. SER. 25, 26 (1964) (special relationship between public and judge is a
source of stability in a democratic society).
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the overriding concern for an independent judiciary. 6 ' The Randolph court
reasoned that there is more to politics than partisan political activity. The

court noted that advocate organizations play a vital role in the exercise of
political power, and political activity includes activity supporting opposing
sides of social, political, or legislative issues. Consequently, issue activity so
defined is political activity. 66
The court further stated that it was not imposing a blanket ban on civic
and charitable activities. 67 It observed that the holding did apply to the
same type of activities permitted by Canon 5(B). 168 The position adopted by

the New Jersey Supreme Court leaves little doubt as to the scope of Canon
7(A)(4)-a ban on all off-bench activities on behalf of organizations which
support an identifiable viewpoint on matters of public concern.
In In re Staples, 169 the Washington Supreme Court took an expansive view
of the political activities allowed by Canon 7(A)(4).170 The court held that
Canon 7(A)(4) applied only to partisan political activity, and not to nonpartisan, civic-minded political activity. 7' In Staples, a judge circulated

165. "This concern for an independent judiciary is at the heart of the American legal
system." 101 N.J. 425, 433, 502 A.2d 533, 537. See Canon 1, supra note 4.
166. 101 N.J. at 436, 502 A.2d at 539.
167. Id. at 455, 502 A.2d at 549. Justice Garibaldi argued that the majority's broad
classification of political activity was an effectual ban on any civic involvement. Id. at 465,
502 A.2d at 554 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion whose reasoning parallels
the Randolph court's position regarding civic and charitable activities. A part-time New Hampshire judge was advised that membership on the Steering Committee of Common Cause of
New Hampshire should not be accepted. The court noted that the activity in question may not
reflect adversely on the judge's impartiality or interfere with his judicial duties. But, the court
also noted that the activities of the organization were "arguably political," and the organization
did engage in court proceedings which would therefore violate Canon 5(B). New Hampshire
Advisory Opinion, Dec. 12, 1985, 12 N.H.L.W., Jan. 1, 1986, at 375, col. 3. The most
significant portion of the opinion stated that Canons 1 and 2 would be violated by "[p]articipation
in a policy-making role in a quasi-political organization [since it] could reduce public confidence
in a judge." Id.
168. 101 N.J. 425, 436-37, 502 A.2d 533, 539. The court extended Canon 5(B)'s ban on
extrajudicial activities which are "conducted for the . . . political advantage of its members,"
to organizations advocating issues that may come before a court. Id. at 437, 502 A.2d at 539.
169. 105 Wash. 2d 905, 719 P.2d 558 (1986). The Staples court noted that, to its knowledge,
no other jurisdiction had yet defined the scope of permissible political activity directed toward
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. Id. at 909, 719 P.2d at 561. In In
re Davis, 249 Ga. 248, 291 S.E.2d 547 (1982), a justice of the peace claimed that his participation
in a recall movement and mayoral election were excused under Canon 7(A)(4) since he was
acting in the city's best interests. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected this claim.
170. The Staples court rejected the Judicial Qualifications Commission's narrow reading
of "administration of justice" as including only measures directly related to court procedures
and rules. 105 Wash. 2d at 909-10, 719 P,2d at 561. The Commission also relied on its
conclusion that Judge Staples's claim, that the county seat had to be moved to avoid a
constitutional conflict, was invalid. The Washington Supreme Court did not decide the validity
of this claim, but instead relied on the public benefit from a better functioning court system
that Judge Staples's efforts could have yielded. Id.
171. Id.
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petitions, made campaign speeches, organized a committee, and ran newspaper advertisements in a highly visible and controversial effort to move the
county seat.' 72 The Staples court held that the concededly political activity
fell within the 7(A)(4) exception to the general prohibition of political
activity. "
The Staples court based its decision in part on the lack of conflict with
the three purposes behind Canon 7's general ban on political activity. 74 The
court noted that Judge Staples' activities had not otherwise impaired his
performance of judicial duties. 75 The court then summarily dismissed the
possibility that actual bias or apparent bias might result, or that the court's
esteem was threatened. The court stated that such dangers simply do not
exist where civic-minded nonpartisan activities are involved. 7 6 The court also
acknowledged that a judge does not lose his rights as a citizen by assuming
the bench, 77 concluding that a narrow interpretation of Canon 7(A)(4) would
chill the efforts of individuals who are best suited to improve the judicial

system. 178
The Staples decision may later prove to be limited to its particular facts,
but it stands as a well reasoned decision that establishes criteria by which
to judge judicial political activity. The decision does not address controversial
judicial conduct generally, nor can it fairly be extended to all issue-oriented
activity by judges. However, the court's decision is a departure from many
other cases in that it credits the public's ability to discern proper from
improper behavior.
It is difficult to reconcile the Staples decision with the Randolph court's
holding. The two cases represent disparate approaches to off-bench conduct.
The Washington Supreme Court trusts that the public's perception of an
impartial judiciary is threatened only where a judge is involved in partisan

172. Id. at 906-07, 719 P.2d at 559-60. The circumstances which led to the effort to move
the county seat were the existence of two duplicative court facilities, an old building at the
county seat, and a new facility in another town. The court predominantly used the new facility,
although the older facility was the "proper" courthouse. Id.
173. Id. at 910-11, 719 P.2d at 561.
174. Those purposes the court recognized are:
(I) participation in outside activities so extensive that the time and energy available
for the primary obligation are measurably impaired; (2) participation in ... activities
that may lead to actual bias or the appearance of prejudgment of issues likely to
come before the court; and (3) actions that impair the dignity and esteem [of] the
court ....

Id.(citations omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The court also noted that judges were specifically granted authority under the
Code to engage in limited political activity, and if they could not, the benefits to legal reform
would be lost. Id.
178. Id. at 912, 719 P.2d at 562. In conclusion, the Staples court alluded to the full
history of judicial involvement in what, for lack of a better term, could broadly be defined as
the administration of justice. Id.
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politics. Consequently, a judge enjoys appreciable latitude of discretion in
off-bench speech and associational activities. On the other hand, the New
Jersey Supreme Court appears wary of any activity that may be even remotely
connected with politics or controversial political issues. As a result of this
posture, the Randolph court granted little credit to the public's ability to
evaluate the propriety of judicial off-bench activities and imposed severe
restrictions on judicial conduct. However, the Randolph decision reflects the
general assumption that controversial conduct must adversely affect public
confidence in the judiciary.
V.

THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE BASED UPON ILL-DEFINED
STANDARDS

Courts which have disciplined judges for controversial or issue-oriented
activities may have gone too far in the direction of a presumption of
partiality.179 This assumption of partiality has led to interpretations of the
Code which severely restrict a judge's off-bench life. The goals of maintaining
the appearance of impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary seem
to have taken precedence over other considerations. Scant attention is paid
to whether or not off-bench activities actually interfere with official duties
s
or exploit the judicial office.Iw
It is also noteworthy that none of the Code
provisions explicitly prohibit a judge from making public statements on
current issues.' Despite this fact, judges are, or apparently may be, disciplined for the appearance of partiality that their public conduct may convey.
Judicial discipline which relies solely on appearances may effectively isolate
judges from society.8 2 Judge Fuchsberg is not alone when he states that

179. See Markey, supra note 1 and accompanying text. Markey argues that the Code and
statutes should be revised so as to yield a salutary presumption of impartiality. Id. at 383.
180. The Staples court did consider whether Judge Staples had carried out his duties, but
did not examine whether he had exploited his office. In Shilling v. State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 397, 401-03, 415 N.E.2d 900, 901-02, 434 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910-11 (1980),
the court thought it was improper for a judge to announce that he was a judge when he sought,
in his private capacity, to help a local animal shelter. The dissent thought the court relied too
heavily on this factor, and that the majority's view would require judges to unnecessarily move
about in a cloak of anonymity. Iii. at 408, 415 N.E.2d at 905, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
181. Volcansek, supra note 37, at 503. Volcansek evaluated a survey of Texas judges'
attitudes toward off-bench activities taken both before and a few years after the Code was
adopted in that state. She notes that the survey revealed the percentage of judges who thought
speaking on public issues was prohibited nearly doubled in the two-year interim between the
surveys. Id. Donald Hall, in a critical commentary on judicial discipline, asserts that public
statements by judges advocating controversial viewpoints are inherently political. Hall, supra
note 94, at 133.
182. See Markey, supra note 1, at 383. Judge Markey observes that the public is demanding
greater judicial involvement in managing society, and less judicial involvement in society offthe-bench. Id. at 377. Jeffrey Shaman notes that too many restrictions on a judge's life will
be like placing them in a monastery and will diminish their judicial ability. Shaman, supra note
63, at 24. See also Grossman, A Political View of Judicial Ethics, 9 SAN Dreoo L. REv. 803,
809 (1972) (strict limits on off-bench activity reduces judicial vision and independence of judicial
thought).
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"[j]urists do not sit in isolated, cloistered, legal splendor, completely detached
from responsibilities to the community .... ,,183 Restrictions on off-bench
involvement with topical, controversial issues raise a question as to whether
or not judges enjoy any free speech or associational rights.
For example, Judge Bonin's discipline for attempting to inform himself
about "contentious issues of social importance"' 84 by merely attending a
lecture offers little hope that judges may enjoy first amendment rights of
association and speech.' 5 Judge Bonin was censured in part because the
court concluded that his conduct conveyed an appearance of impropriety,
yet there was arguably no other violation of the Code.8 6 Justice Baucher
noted in his dissent in Bonin, that he would be reluctant to censure a judge
solely because of an appearance of impropriety. 8 7 As Justice Baucher noted:
The injunction of Canon 2 ... must not be read to require that a judge
cater to public misunderstanding or prejudice in his extrajudicial conduct.
His duty to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full
discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject
him or the legal profession to criticism.-A

Likewise, the order advising Judge Richette' s9 not to speak on a controversial topic can only be justified if the public confidence is shaken through
the expression of unpopular views by judges.' 9° Finally, as the Judicial
Council of the Sixth Circuit recently asserted, judicial independence is obliterated if discipline is based upon public disagreement or unhappiness with
a judge's opinion, and discipline will not change the judge's opinions. 91

183. Shilling v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 397, 406, 415 N.E.2d 900,
904, 434 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
184. In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 707, 378 N.E.2d 669, 683 (1978).
185. Lubet, supra note 25, at 1005-06.
186. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
187. 375 Mass. 680, 729, 378 N.E.2d 669, 693 (1978) (Braucher, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 730, 378 N.E.2d at 694.
189. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
190. Judge Richette's speech should have been permissible under Canon 4 since it was
directly related to legal issues facing the legal system in Nicaragua. Under Canon 5(A), her
speech would have been unlikely to foster doubts about her impartiality in cases likely to come
before her court, since it is unlikely she would ever face the issue. Finally, a speech given on
her own time could hardly have entrenched on her official duties. Obviously, no Code or
similar provisions were in danger of being violated. The only prohibitions the speech could
have violated are those restrictions on political activity. Of course, one must accept controversial
or topical issues as inherently political to prohibit her speech on this basis.
191. In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 84-6-372-08, 84-6-372-10 (6th Cir.
Jud. Coun. Mar. 11, 1985). See generally Lubet, supra note 25, at 999-1002 (analysis of the
case and Judge Feikens' statements in light of treatment afforded cases involving racial epithets).
Since the controversy over Judge Feikens' statements to the press which prompted the complaints
to the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, his impartiality has been unsuccessfully challenged on at
least two occasions. See In re City of Detroit, Detroit Water and Sewerage Dep't, 828 F.2d
1160 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding Judge Feikens' refusal to disqualify himself in pending cases
which involved same litigants who were the subject of his off-bench statements in the earlier
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Steven Lubet, professor of law at Northwestern University and a critic of

judicial discipline, has argued that the regulation of conduct to maintain
appearances must be balanced against a judge's legitimate right to expression
and freedom of association.92 This involves balancing the risk of a narrow

and unresponsive judiciary against any possible erosion of public confidence.

93

It has been noted that the correlation between a judge's private

behavior and the public's confidence have only a facial relationship because
no scientific or statistical data support any direct correlation between the
two.1 94 Similarly, evaluation of public reaction to judicial conduct is a highly

subjective exercise which should be carefully undertaken. 95
In spite of the difficulty in assessing the effect of particular conduct on
the public confidence in the judiciary, courts continue to assume a detrimental
effect where none has been shown. In In re La Motte, '96 the Florida Supreme
Court disciplined a judge for conduct which should have eroded public
confidence, regardless of any actual loss of public confidence. 97 In a similar
vein, the Maryland Supreme Court has espoused a "we will know it when
we see it approach" to judicial misconduct. 19 In In re Stevens,

99

the

California Supreme Court censured a judge for his repeated use of racial
slurs and offensive language off-the-bench. 200 The majority in Stevens noted
that a public perception of bias, whether or not it affected the court's
judgments, prejudiced the administration of justice. 20' In his dissent, Justice

complaints to the Judicial Council); Duke v. Pfizer, Inc., United Div. of Pfizer Hospital Prods.
Group, 668 F. Supp. 1031 (1987) (denying motion for new trial where members of firm
representing defendant had testified on behalf of Judge Feikens at disciplinary hearing). These
recent challenges to Judge Feikens' impartiality demonstrate the risk of a loss of judicial
independence attendant upon even an unsuccessful complaint of misconduct.
192. Lubet, supra note 25, at 1007. Jeffrey Shaman, professor of law at DePaul University
College of Law and Director of the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations of the American
Judicature Society, warns that:
(R]estrictions upon a judge's freedom of speech should not be pushed too far.
There is little value in prohibiting judges from speaking when they cannot-and
should not-be prohibited from thinking. And there is much to be lost if judges are
precluded from participating in matters of public concern.
Shaman, supra note 63, at 25. See also Mosk, Judges Have First Amendment Rights, 2 CAL.
LAW. 30 (Oct. 1982) (judges must be free to speak no matter how distasteful that speech may
be).
193. Lubet, supra note 25, at 1007.
194. See Martineau, supra note 26, at 245; Hall, supra note 94, at 149.
195. Federal District Judge Frank Battisti charges that what passes for legitimate standards
are merely arbitrary, personal, or vague notions. Battisti, supra note 48, at 360.
196. 341 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977).
197. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
198. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 671, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.

989 (1974). See also text accompanying note 99.
199. 31 Cal. 3d 403, 645 P.2d 99, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982).

200. Id. at 403-04, 645 P.2d at 99-100, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
201. Id. at 405, 645 P.2d at 100, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (Kaus, J., concurring). The court's
standard is essentially the same as that established in Canon 2 of the Code. See Lubet, supra
note 25, at 1001-02.
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Mosk agreed that the language was offensive, but argued that the censure
was based upon the disciplinary commission's "self-determined standard of
20 2
appropriate taste and style in language.
The majority's position in Stevens may be irrefutable where racial slurs
are involved, but can the court's public perception rationale be extended to
encompass statements of opinion on controversial issues? Surely, some minority could take offense with a judge's public stance on abortion, court
reform, or foreign policy. If for the sake of appearances courts prohibit offbench activities involving these topics, can the public then be assured that a
judge is impartial? 2 3 Finally, prohibiting off-bench expression on topical,
controversial, or political issues deprives the public of a means of assessing
the quality and viewpoints of the judges that are entrusted to guard individual
rights. 20 4 Judge Battisti has argued that what passes for legitimate standardsappearances-are actually arbitrary, vague, or personal notions. 20 5 He con2
cludes that judges can only be fairly judged on their work. 0
The Code tends to support the perpetuation of a nonpolitical image of
judges. 0 7 In light of this image, Professor Dalton argues that the free reign
given to law related activities, as opposed to issue-oriented extrajudicial
activities, is unjustified. Dalton views both types of activity as political and
entailing the same risks. 20 Dalton's observation that law related activities
permissible under Canon 4 (and Canon 7(A)(4)) can be issue-oriented and

politically controversial is borne out by the Mikva, 2 9 Richette,201 and Staples12
21 2
cases, and would probably be consistent with the Randolph case.
For instance, a judge's law review article evaluating the uneven imposition
of the death penalty and concluding that it should be consistently imposed

202. 31 Cal. 3d at 407, 645 P.2d at 101, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
203. See In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 84-6-372-08, 84-6-372-10 at 2 (6th
Cir. Jud. Coun. Mar. 11, 1985).
204. Judge Alarcon of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, finds the limitations on judicial
expression particularly threatening in states where judges are still elected. A voter may decide
incorrectly where the only information available to him is that presented by the media and
decisions of great public interest. Alarcon, Political Appointments and Judicial Independence
- An UnreasonableExpectation, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 9, 13 (1983). Judges may also be the
persons best suited to settle public issues that are hopelessly distorted and fractional. Dalton,
supra note 79, at 1716.
205. Battisti, supra note 48, at 360.
206. Id.
207. Grossman, supra note 182, at 809. Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit Court argues
that contrary to popular belief, judges do apply the law and not their own politics. He reasons
that the confusion stems from the fact that judges are pulled into politics independent of their
own will when they are called upon to decide controversial cases. Edwards, supra note 89, at
626-27.
208. Dalton, supra note 79, at 1721-22.
209. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
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is no less controversial or political than a politician's campaign to repeal the
same law. Although the judge who wrote the article should perhaps recuse
himself from all later cases where it might be imposed, it is unlikely he
213
would be required to do so.
Why then should a judge be prohibited from participation in off-bench
activities on other controversial issues, particularly in the unlikely event that
he would need to later recuse himself? After all, judges are presumed to be
able to apply the law. Judicial history is replete with instances where courts
have applied the law although they did not agree with the result. Abstention
from off-bench activities should only be required where a judge's impartiality
could seriously be questioned, where he was neglecting his duties, or where
he was attempting to further the interests of actual or potential litigants.
The Code currently includes each of these as a basis for limiting off-bench
conduct, but the application of an "appearances" standard to these considerations serves to extend the prohibitions well beyond the interest they
attempt to protect.
VI.

PROPOSED REFORMS

The following is a proposal to amend the Code so as to assure judicial
independence and participation in societal affairs while retaining the requisite
counterparts of accountability and public confidence.
I. An independent judiciary should remain informed and responsive to
community and legal goals so that a judge does not become isolated from
the public he serves. (Insert as the last sentence of Canon 1).
II. A judge is not required to sacrifice all speech and associational rights.
However, a judge should evaluate any conduct addressed by other provisions of this Code and refrain from activities that may impinge upon his
ability to fulfill his duties impartially. (Insert as last sentence of first
paragraph of Commentary of Canon 2).

III. Commentary: Although activities under Canons 4 and 5 may be issueoriented, nothing in this Canon should be read to prohibit the activities
condoned under those provisions. A judge should refrain from activities
permitted under Canon 7(A)(4) that involve a judge in the practical
administration of a political campaign. (Insert this Commentary after

Canon 7(A)(4)).
The goal of Amendment I is to establish explicit recognition of the interest
judges should have in societal affairs and the right of the public to keep
abreast of the goals and attitudes of those entrusted with judicial office.
The language is calculated to inform judges and judicial disciplinary agencies
that off-bench activities need not necessarily threaten the independence of
the judiciary. Finally, the amendment is an explicit recognition that an
informed, involved judiciary can maintain its integrity.

213. See In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1982) (judges required to follow law; expressing
opinion contrary to law, inadvisable, but not impermissible); Judicial Inquiry Comm'n of West
Virginia v. McGraw, 299 S.E.2d 872, 874 (W.Va. 1983) (noting the considerable body of law
holding that judges are not disqualified because of off-bench expression of opinion on the law).
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Amendment II adds to the first by recognizing that not all rights are
sacrificed by judges. Ideally, the second sentence will lead to a more careful
analysis of the actual effect of judicial activities on the public's trust and
confidence. Another goal of the amendment is to direct attention to substantive violations of Canons 3 through 7, and properly limit Canon 2 so
that judges are not punished or restricted merely to maintain appearances.
Amendment III serves to recognize the controversial and political nature
of many activities permitted by the Code. It is impossible to completely
separate all community or legal involvement from the political sphere. The
final sentence of the amendment would effectively ban activities similar to
those that Judge Staples engaged in 214-organizing and conducting a political
campaign, whether on behalf of the legal system or not. The purpose is to
avoid the difficulty of keeping judges out of what the public would perceive
as traditional partisan politics. However, a judge would still be free to
advocate reforms, through other channels, that benefit the legal system.
Although it is difficult to refine ethical codes and avoid challenges and
conflicts, the appearance of impropriety standard should be further defined.
However, the definition of impropriety lies largely with the courts and judicial
disciplinary commissions. The lack of adequate direction with regard to the
propriety of judicial membership in organizations that practice discrimination
led the ABA to amend the Model Code in August of 1985.21" The Commentary to Canon 2 now states that it is inappropriate to belong to organizations
that invidiously discriminate, but in a classic case of fence-straddling, it
6
leaves membership in such organizations to individual discretion. 1
Any amendments to the Code should avoid such "fencestradling" so as
to be an effective and concrete guide to judges. Perhaps an addition to the
Commentary could grant an exception for nonpartisan or civic-minded offbench activities. Additionally, a recognition of the political role judges play,
even outside of partisan politics, could be added. A reasonable person or
community standard basis for evaluating judicial conduct could be adopted.
Ultimately, any of these proposals must serve to remind judicial disciplinary
boards of the balance of rights the Code should accomplish. None of these
proposed changes will protect judges from discipline for merely being controversial, but it may go a long way toward influencing decisions.
CONCLUSION

The goal of the Code is to assure the integrity and independence of the
courts. Maintaining the appearance of impartiality should bear some relation
to actual impartiality. The adoption of the Code was a step in the right
direction, but it needs to be amended so that society does not lose the benefit

214. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
215. MODEL RUtES oF PROFESSIONAL
(amended Aug. 7, 1984).
216. Shaman, supra note 63, at 26.
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of off-bench judicial participation in societal affairs. Further, the Code
should reflect the idea that judges will not be susceptible to intimidation for
exercising their first amendment rights.
James D. Noseda

